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ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURES AND
THE LAW REGULATING IRISH PRISONS
This publication seeks to raise awareness of prison law and
prisoners’ rights jurisprudence amongst legal professionals,
and to increase their research capacity in these areas. It
is part of a series of three papers, one of which examines
the law on aspects of prison conditions; the other explores
practical matters surrounding the taking of prison law
cases.
The topic of this paper is ‘accountability structures and
the law regulating Irish prisons’. It examines the aspects of
the law regarding how decisions are made in prisons and
the requirements for accountability for deaths and other
serious incidents in custody.
This publication is funded by the Irish Research Council
for the Humanities and Social Sciences, as part of its
Research Development Initiative. It is produced as part of a
collaborative project between the Irish Penal Reform Trust
and Dr. Mary Rogan BL of Dublin Institute of Technology
called ‘Talking about Punishment: increasing understanding
of prisoners’ rights and how those rights may be vindicated”.
This paper seeks to state the law as of June 2012. No
liability is accepted for any errors or omissions or for
how this document is used. It is intended as a form of
research assistance for legal practitioners and not to act
as a substitute for legal advice. All errors and omissions
are the responsibility of Dr. Mary Rogan. Those using this
document are encouraged to submit any corrections and/or
supplementary information Dr. Mary Rogan at
mary.rogan@dit.ie.
The full text of relevant international legal instruments
on prisons and prisoners’ rights, along with reports of the
Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture,
the Inspector of Prisons, and other bodies, can be found at
www.iprt.ie/prison-law.
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STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
This paper discusses the legal status of the Prison Rules, 2007. It then examines the legal
basis under which prisoners may make complaints about aspects of their detention to
the prison authorities. The paper also explores international human rights principles
governing complaints mechanisms for prisoners. The issue of the denial of visits to
prisoners is discussed in particular detail. Finally, the requirements of the European
Convention on Human Rights to carry out effective investigations into possible breaches
of Articles 2 and 3 (the right to life and the right to freedom from torture or inhuman and
degrading treatment respectively) are discussed. Caselaw on the requirements for the
effective investigation of deaths in prison and incidents of ‘near-suicides’ or serious selfharm is presented.
This paper focuses on the law regulating how prisoners can take complaints and the
investigative structures for deaths in prison or other serious incidents. Other matters
concerning accountability in the prison system such as those around decisions on early
release, are not examined here.

THE PRISON RULES 2007
The Prison Rules 20071 are the main statutory basis for the treatment of prisoners. They
lay out what prisoners are entitled to and what they can expect in terms of their treatment.
The Rules provide for matters such as accommodation, food, hygiene, and discipline.
The Rules were made by Statutory Instrument, under the power given to the Minister for
Justice under section 35 of the Prisons Act 2007. The status of the predecessor of the
2007 Rules has been examined in caselaw. In State (Walsh and McGowan) v. Governor of
Mountjoy Prison2 O’Higgins CJ described the 1947 Rules as having statutory effect. As
McDermott notes “there is no doubt that the Prison Rules are justiciable in the sense that
breaches of them may give rise to judicial review proceedings”. It is not clear, however,
if a breach of them is considered also breach of statutory duty.3 It is not possible to
pursue a claim for breach of statutory duty under the Prison Rules in England and Wales.
tIt was held in R v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex parte Hague and Weldon4 that
the Prison Act 1952 was concerned with the management and administration of prisons
and prisoners and it could not be concluded that Parliament had intended to confer
any private law rights of action in respect of the rules. Lord Bridge, however, disagreed,
holding that the provisions of the rules regarding the treatment of prisoners was broad
enough to allow for the enactment of rules which did give rise to a cause of action for
breach of statutory duty. None of the Rules did provide for this so the matter was moot.
It should be noted that many of the Prison Rules 2007 contain the saver ‘so far as
practicable’, giving wide discretion to the prison authorities in the implementation of
the Rules. Devoy v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison,5 however, recognised that the manner
in which the Rules are applied must be in compliance with the Constitution, save in
emergency situations of extraordinary and excusatory circumstances of the type referred
to in DPP v. Shaw.6

1
2
3
4
5
6

4

S.I. No. 252/2007.
Unreported, High Court, December 12 1975.
See further, McDermott, Prison Law (Dublin, Round Hall, 2000) at pp. 13–14.
[1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340.
[2009] IEHC 288.
[1982] IR 1.
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When assessing a prisoner’s cause of action, examining the relevant provisions of the
Prison Rules can assist in determining if the impugned action is grounded in law, and if
any such rule is clear.
The Prison Rules cover, inter alia, the following areas:

1.

Reception and registration (including searches on arrival, photographing,
medical examinations, explanation of rights);

2.

The treatment of prisoners (including provision for when there is
insufficient prison accommodation, clothing, food and drink, sanitary and
washing facilities, out-of-cell time, health, visits, telephone calls, transport,
searches of property, grievance procedures, remission);

3.

Control, discipline and sanctions (the use of special observation cells, the
use of restraints, breaches of discipline);

4.

Young prisoners;

5.

Prisoners not serving a sentence;

6.

Healthcare (duties of the prison doctor, records);

7.

Education and vocational training.

The full text of the Rules, along with other prison law materials, is available
on www.iprt.ie/prison-law.

PRISONERS MAKING COMPLAINTS
Prisoners who have a complaint about aspects of their detention and/or the non
compliance by the prison authorities with the Prison Rules may make a complaint through
the internal complaints mechanism. The Prison Rules 2007 formally govern this internal
procedure. At present, the policies on making complaints are being, though it is not clear if
there will be changes made in law.
The system by which a complaint can be made may differ from prison to prison.
The difficulty for practitioners is that, unlike England and Wales, internal prison policy
documents are not freely available publicly. The Prison Rules gives limited detail on what
the complaints mechanism should be like. This may be relevant when assessing whether
any such system has foundation in statute.
The Prison Rules 2007 state:

55.

(1) The Governor shall, as soon as is practicable, meet with a prisoner where the
prisoner so requests.
(2) Where at a meeting to which this Rule applies, the prisoner makes a complaint
to or request of the Governor, or brings to the Governor’s attention any other matter
relating to the prisoner in respect of which a decision by the Governor is warranted,
the Governor shall, upon making a decision in relation to any such complaint, request
or matter, notify the prisoner as soon as is practicable thereafter.
(3) The Governor shall record the date and time on which a meeting under this Rule
took place, the name of the prisoner concerned, the nature of any request, complaint
or matter brought to the Governor’s attention during the meeting and the decision
(if any) of the Governor in relation thereto.
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57.

(1) A prisoner may make a request, in writing, to the Governor to meet with an
officer of the Minister (other than the Governor, a prison officer or any other person
working in the prison) and the Governor shall, upon receipt of such request, forward
the request without undue delay to the Director General.
(2) An officer of the Minister, designated by the Director General, shall, as soon as
ispracticable, visit the prisoner and hear any request or complaint which the prisoner
may wish to make.
(3) Subject to the requirements of security, good order and the government of the prison, a
meeting between a prisoner and an officer of the Minister attending the prison pursuant
to this Rule shall take place within the view, and except where the prisoner or officer of
the Minister requests otherwise, out of the hearing of a prison officer.
(4) Where at a meeting to which this Rule applies the prisoner makes a complaint to
or request of the officer of the Minister concerned, or brings to his or her attention
any other matter relating to the prisoner in respect of which a course of action by the
Governor is warranted, or appeals against any decision made by the Governor, the
officer of the Minister may –
(a) make a recommendation to the Governor, or
(b) recommend to the prisoner that he or she make the complaint or
request to the Governor or bring the matter to the attention of the
Governor, and the officer may, before making a recommendation under
this paragraph, seek the views of the Governor in relation to the request,
complaint or other matter, as the case may be.
(5) Where the Governor fails or refuses to give full effect to a recommendation of
an officer of the Minister under paragraph (4)(a) the Director General may give
a direction to the Governor in relation to the complaint, request or other matter
concerned and the Governor shall comply with the direction.
(6) The Governor shall record –
(a) the prisoner’s name,
(b) the date on which a request under this Rule was made,
(c) the date on which it was forwarded under this Rule,
(d) the date on which a meeting under this Rule took place,
(e) a recommendation made or direction given under this Rule, and
(f) any action taken or decision made by him or her pursuant to such
recommendatio n or direction.

These provisions are separate to the disciplinary procedures for prisoners,
which are not dealt with in this paper.
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The Inspector of Prisons has set out the general procedure followed when prisoners
make complaints.7 The procedure as noted by the Inspector is as follows. The prisoner
receives a prisoner complaint form which s/he uses (if able to) to write out the nature of
the complaint. This form is given to the Governor who delegates the investigation of the
complaint to a prison officer of rank not below Chief Officer. A photocopy of the complaint
form is given to all pri son officers referred to in the complaint made by the prisoner
or those who are rostered for duty in the area referred to in the complaint form. These
officers are asked for their observations. No time limit is placed on their reply.
There is the possibility that other prisoners may be asked to provide statements if they
witnessed an incident. The Chief Officer may view CCTV if available. When the Chief
Officer has taken the evidence, s/he completes a report of the investigation. Usually this
will include the Chief Officer’s own assessment of the complaint and a recommendation.
This, along with the original complaint form, statements and other evidence are sent to
the Governor.
The Governor will make a decision on the complaint. According to the Inspector of Prisons’
report, in most cases this is done without taking oral evidence or directing other inquiries.
The prisoner does not usually have a right of rebuttal.
The prisoner is informed of the determination of the complaint by a nominated prison
officer. The prisoner receives the completed complaint form back which advises the
prisoner that it is possible to appeal the decision of the Governor.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW ON PRISONER COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS
This section examines caselaw and international human rights principles on how
prisoners complaints should be dealt with. It indicates some ways in which current Irish
procedures may be deficient.

AWARENESS OF RIGHTS
Rule 13 of the Prison Rules 2007 states that each prisoner on admission should be given
an explanatory booklet outlining his or her entitlements, obligations, and privileges under
the Rules. Each prisoner who was admitted to prison before the commencement of the
Rules should also receive such a booklet. A full copy of the Rules should also be available
for examination by prisoners. Such booklets should be provided to foreign prisoners
in a language they understand; if not, reasonable efforts must be made to ensure that
the said contents are explained to him or her in a language that he or she understands.
Where a prisoner is unable to read or is unable to understand the contents of the
booklet, the Governor should take all reasonable measures to ensure that the prisoner’s
entitlements, obligations, and privileges under the Rules are explained to him or her as
soon as is practicable.

7
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Inspector of Prisons, Guidance on Best Practice relating to Prisoners’ Complaints and Prison Discipline (Nenagh,
Inspector of Prisons, 2010), available at: http://www.inspectorofprisons.gov.ie/en/IOP/Pages/PB10000003.
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Rule 30 of the European Prison Rules provides that when a person is admitted to prison
s/he should receive a copy of the rules governing the prison, which should set out their
rights and duties and the operation of the complaints process in a language the prisoner
can understand. Rule 30(1) states that if a person is unable to read, s/he should be
informed of his or her rights orally. The Rules also state that each prison should have a
designated person to assist prisoners to make complaints. Rule 35 of the UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners make similar provision. Separately,
it should be noted that Rule 70.4 of the European Prison Rules states that prison
authorities should ensure that prisoners are not disadvantaged for exercising their right
to make a complaint.
The European Court of Human Rights in Ciorap v. Moldova8 took the failure of the prison
authorities to give the prisoner concerned information about his rights into account in
finding breaches of Article 3 and Article 8. The applicant had argued that the failure to give
this information amounted to a breach of Article 10 (the right to freedom of expression).
The Court felt it was not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 10 because of
its findings under Articles 3 and 8.

THE NATURE OF THE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE
The European Prison Rules, which the European Court of Human Rights has taken into
account in examining applications by prisoners to it, give guidance on the structure of
an internal complaints procedure. Rule 70 states that a prisoner should have sufficient
opportunity to make a request or a complaint to prison management. All such requests
should be dealt with promptly and the prisoner informed of the outcome. Mediation is
favoured by the Rules and formal proceedings should only go ahead when this fails. The
CPT also states that access to the director of the prison or any other competent authority
must be confidential.9
The Rules also state that a prisoner should have the right to appeal decisions by prison
management to an independent body. If the prisoner withdraws a complaint, the reasons
for this withdrawal should be investigated. Rule 36 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules
contains similar provisions. These rules provide that each weekday every prisoner should
have the opportunity of making a request or complaint to the director of the prison or an
authorised officer.
Rule 70(5) of the European Prison Rules also state that a prisoner’s legal advisor or a
family member shall be entitled to make a request or complaint regarding the prisoner’s
treatment to the prison authorities. Under Rule 70(7) prisoners are entitled to seek legal
advice about complaints and appeals procedures and to legal assistance when the
interests of justice require.
In its second General Report, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture stated that
“effective grievance and inspection procedures are fundamental safeguards against
ill-treatment in prisons. Prisoners should have avenues of complaint open to them both
within and outside the context of the prison system”.10

8
9

19 June 2007, no. 12066/02.
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 2nd General Report, CPT/Inf (92) 3, available at:
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep–02.htm.
10 Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 2nd General Report, CPT/Inf (92) 3, available at:
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-02.htm, at paragraph 54.
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CASELAW ON COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES
The nature of complaints procedures has been litigated on a few occasions before the
European Court of Human Rights.
Though this point has yet to be decided, it may be that a future case could consider the
absence of an independent complaints mechanism as an aspect of the failure to take
steps to prevent harm as required under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The Court has
already made it clear that Article 2 and Article 3 require effective investigations where
there are concerns regarding breaches of this provisions. This caselaw is explored later in
this paper.
The European Court of Human Rights has also held that the Convention imposes positive
obligations on states to take steps to prevent breaches of Convention rights. For example,
Z v. United Kingdom11 concerned the provision of adequate child protection arrangements.
The Court recognised a positive obligation arising out of Article 3. It held:

[Article 3] prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. The obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the
Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires States
to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction
are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such
ill-treatment administered by private individuals. These measures should provide
effective protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and
include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or
ought to have had knowledge.12

While the absence of an effective complaints mechanism may be a facet of a claim regarding
the failure to prevent harm under Articles 2 or 3, the right to an effective remedy under
Article 13 of the Convention is also engaged. Article 13 entitles everyone to an effective
remedy where their rights and freedoms under the Convention have been breached.
It is not clear what the European Court of Human Rights would consider to be a
satisfactory system of complaints. The Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the
European Prison Rules have, however, laid emphasis on the need for independence from
the prison administration in any such system.13
The case of Silver and others v. United Kingdom14 (hereinafter Silver) involved a complaint
by prisoners regarding the control of their mail by the prison authorities. This was argued
to be a breach of their rights to respect for correspondence under Articles 8 and 10 of
the Convention. They further alleged that no effective domestic remedy existed for these
breaches, contrary to Article 13. At the time, prisoners in England and Wales could make
complaints to the Board of Visitors (akin to our Visiting Committees) and make petitions to
the Home Secretary, as well as complain to a prison officer. Prisoners could also complain
to the then Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, a precursor to the now
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, and apply to the courts.

11 (2002) 34 EHRR 97.
12 (2002) 34 EHRR 97, at paragraph 73. Internal citations omitted.
13 See further van zyl Smit and Snacken, Principles of European Prison Law and Policy (Oxford, Oxford 		
University Press, 2009) at p. 310.
14 (1981) 3 EHRR 475.
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On the facts, the Court considered that neither a complaint to the Board of Visitors nor to
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration constituted an effective remedy.
The Board of Visitors could not entertain applications from individuals who were not
currently in prison, and thus could not deal with past complaints. The Commissioner had
no power to render a binding decision granting redress.
As for the Home Secretary, the Court held that “he could not be considered to have a
sufficiently independent standpoint to satisfy the requirements of Article 13… as the
author of the directives in question, he would in reality be judge in his own cause”.15
The situation would, however, be different if the complainant petitioned the Home
Secretary on the basis that one of the directives had been misapplied. If that was so, the
Court considered such a petition could in general be effective to secure compliance with
the directive. The Court noted also that, in the past, there were restrictions on the ability
to make such a complaint e.g. with certain exceptions a prisoner could not petition if and
so long as he was awaiting a reply to an earlier petition.
Regarding applications to the English courts, the Court noted that the jurisdiction
of the domestic courts was limited to determining whether or not the powers of the
prison authorities have been exercised arbitrarily, in bad faith, for an improper motive
or in an ultra vires manner. At the time, moreover, the UK had not incorporated the
Convention. In this case, the applicants were not alleging that the interferences with
their correspondence were contrary to English law, but rather that they breached the
Convention. As such, the Court held that insofar as the norms were incompatible with the
Convention, there could be no effective remedy under Article 13. Regarding those norms
which were compatible with the Convention, the petition to the Home Secretary and
applications to the English courts were sufficient to comply with Article 13.
The partial incorporation of the Convention in Ireland goes some way to addressing this
last point in Silver. Prisoners may write directly to the Central Office of the High Court in
order to petition the court concerning their detention. The High Court may decide to make
a recommendation under the Attorney General’s scheme, for example, when a prisoner is
seeking an order of mandamus in relation to his or her conditions.16 Regarding the informal
petition to the High Court, Charleton J stated in Walsh and others v. Governor of the
Midlands Prison that:

15 (1981) 3 EHRR 475, at paragraph 116.
16 For example, in McCarthy v. The Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2009] IEHC 513, Edwards J granted a
recommendation under the Attorney General’s Scheme for solicitor and one counsel in circumstances where the
prisoner was alleging he had not received the educational assistance which had been directed by the sentencing
judge. The prisoner was unable to read or write and would require assistance in taking the proceedings.
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The applicant also takes issue with the informal system whereby any prisoner in
the State may write to the Central Office of the High Court and make a complaint.
Sometimes these complaints are serious. Each such complaint is investigated and
where necessary a report is sought from the Governor of the relevant prison. A
ruling is then made on the complaint in open court. This is a highly effective means
of ensuring that prisoners are not isolated and that they have an ultimate authority
to which to turn on matters of law. The informality of the system is of core benefit
to its administration. Nothing about that informal procedure disables any form
of judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. Nor could
that system undermine the entitlement of an interested party to apply for habeas
corpus by way of an application to a judge of the High Court in the ordinary
course. The procedure is in addition to other rights and procedures. It amounts to an
exceptional means of access to the High Court that is for the benefit of prisoners.17
However, the matter may not necessarily end there.
In this regard, the case of McFarlane v. Ireland18 on delay in criminal prosecutions
may be instructive. There, the Government argued that the applicant would have an
effective domestic remedy through taking a constitutional action for damages. The Court
considered the very long delays involved in taking such challenges, as well as the burden
of legal costs and expenses. The Court reiterated that excessive costs could constitute an
unreasonable restriction on access to an effective remedy.
The Court held:

While legal representation is not obligatory, as noted above, the remedy would be
legally and procedurally complex. A judicial review action would not be covered
by criminal legal aid, an action in damages would not appear to be covered by the
Attorney General’s ex gratia scheme and the applicant would have to obtain the
agreement of the Civil Legal Aid Board that the remedy had merit before legal aid
would be granted. The action would, at least initially, be novel and uncertain: should
an applicant be unsuccessful, there was a risk of a costs order against him or her;
and, even if damages were pursued as an alternative claim in the prohibition action,
there would be separate costs attributable to the damages claim (notably, those of
the Attorney General who would be a respondent) and thus any costs’ exposure
could be high. The Court considers that the Government have not demonstrated
that, in such circumstances, an applicant would not be unduly hampered in
taking an action for damages for a breach of the constitutional right to reasonable
expedition.19
In the circumstances, the Court found a breach of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6(1).
The absence of a general legal aid scheme for prisoners wishing to challenge decisions
of the prison authorities or the refusal of particular requests, particularly in the context
of plenary proceedings, could be an answer to any suggestion that application to the
domestic courts constitutes an effective remedy in this context. The requirement of the
courts in Ireland for a prisoner to establish ‘evil intent’ on the part of the prison authorities
in order to prove a breach of constitutional rights, as discussed in the first paper in this
series, may also be pertinent.

17 [2012] IEHC 229.
18 10 September 2010, no. 31333/06.
19 10 September 2010, no 31333/06, at paragraph 124. Internal citations omitted.
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van zyl Smit and Snacken argue that:
There is considerable merit in providing such legal advice free of charge to the majority
of prisoners who cannot afford to pay for their own lawyers. This applies to the more
demanding forms of legal assistance which the interests of justice require in any
complaint-related procedures that raise issues of any complexity”.20
Rodic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina21 shows that the Court will examine the theory and reality
of any complaints procedure in terms of its compliance with Article 13. It held there that
the presence of prison inspectors did not provide an effective remedy as, in practice, they
had never once intervened to support a prisoner.
The possible approach of the European Court of Human Rights to the complaints
mechanism and the process by which applications may be made to the Courts is
uncertain. However, the lack of an independent complaints mechanism, coupled with the
difficulties of obtaining legal redress in Ireland, at least raises concerns under Article 13.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH LAWYERS
The Prison Rules 2007 provide under Rule 44 that a letter intended by a prisoner for his or
her legal advisors should be sent without delay and not opened before it is sent. A letter to
a prisoner from his or her legal advisors must be given to the prisoner without delay and
not be examined to any greater extent than is necessary to determine if it is such a letter.
If the letter is to be examined, it is only to be opened in the presence of the prisoner to
whom it is addressed.
The European Court of Human Rights in Campbell v. UK22 upheld a prisoner’s complaint
that his correspondence to his legal advisors had been interfered with. The Court stated
that a prisoner’s right to correspond with the authorities should only be interfered with in
exceptional circumstances. Where it was necessary to open correspondence to verify the
identification of the person or body being corresponded with, this should be done in the
presence of the prisoner.

DENIAL OF VISITS
This section looks at the issue of the denial of visits to prisoners from family members.
It examines Irish and European Court of Human Rights caselaw on the topic.
Foy v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison23 concerned a prisoner who was on remand at the
relevant time. He received visits with his family which were screened, preventing any
physical contact. Mr. Foy claimed that depriving him of physical contact with his
family breached his rights under Article 41 of the Constitution and under Article 8
of the Convention.

20 v an zyl Smit and Snacken, Principles of European Prison Law and Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2009), at p. 12.
21 27 May 28, no. 22893/05.
22 14 October 1982, nos. 7819/77, 7878/77.
23 [2010] IEHC 529.
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Charleton J held that the Prison Rules 2007 give discretion to a prison Governor to
implement the Rules which is “untrammelled provided he does not, by his management,
overturn the Prison Rules”.24
Charleton J emphasised that prisoners are subject to restrictions on their rights by virtue
of the fact of imprisonment and the importance of respecting the opinion of the Governor.
Regarding the prohibition on visits, Charleton J held that unreasonable conduct on the
part of the Governor had not been proven. Furthermore, the possibility of physical contact
with a family member was necessarily limited by virtue of imprisonment. It was for the
Governor to balance the upholding of rights with good order and a decision to prohibit
contact visits on a general basis was a decision within the realm of the measure of
appreciation which a Governor should be afforded.
Charleton J further held that there was no material before him beyond the expression
of an opinion showing that “physical contact between an imprisoned father and minors
is essential to the authority of the family”.25 The High Court held, however, that “the
case presented might… be stronger were it to be the case that, without good reason,
an individual prisoner were restricted permanently from any physical contact with any
relative or friend outside a prison”.26 Charleton J reiterated the importance of deferring to
the decisions made by a prison Governor and the application was refused.
This approach can be contrasted with that of the European Court of Human Rights in a
number of cases. In Messina v. Italy (No. 2)27 the Court noted the importance of prisoners
being able to maintain their ties with people outside prison in order to facilitate their
social rehabilitation and return to the community after release. The European Prison
Rules also contains a statement of this principle in Rule 99.
In Kucera v. Slovenia28 the applicant’s wife was a co-accused and visits between the two
were banned for a period of 13 months. The Court found this ban was not justified under
Article 8 on the basis of the length of time involved and the fact that it was possible to
impose security arrangements if there were concerns about collusion in any particular
meeting. In Lavents v. Latvia29 a prisoner was barred from having family visits for periods
up to 19 months. This was considered by the Court to be unnecessary to prevent collusion
or interference in the investigation into the alleged offences and was a breach of Article 8.
Messina v. Italy (No. 2),30 by contrast, involved members of the mafia in prison.
There, the prisoner was allowed only one visit or phone call per month over long periods.
This was considered by the Court to be justified because of the special security needs
posed by such prisoners and the serious nature of the offences. The authorities relieved
the restrictions intermittently, which the Court took as showing their willingness to assist
the prisoner to maintain links with family. Similarly, in Enea v. Italy31 restrictions on visits
were justified, as they were also in Kalashnikov v. Russia.32 In Kalashnikov v. Russia, the
prisoner was on remand and visits with his family were restricted and, when allowed,
subject to supervision.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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[2010] IEHC 529, at paragraph 13.
[2010] IEHC 529, at paragraph 24.
[2010] IEHC 529, at paragraph 24.
28 September 28 2000, no. 25498/94.
17 July 2007, no. 48666/99.
28 February 2003, no. 58442/00. Translated from the French by the author.
17 July 2007, no. 48666/99.
17 September 2009, no. 74912/01.
18 September 2001, no. 47095/99.
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The Court held this was justified in circumstances where the charges were very serious
and there was a risk of collusion and/or interference in the investigation of the offences.
There must, however, be a plausible security concern to justify such restrictions on visits.
In Krawczak v. Poland33 the prisoner was unable to have physical contact with his partner
and children because of a partition. This was found to breach Article 8 in circumstances
where the use of the partition was arbitrary. The Court considered that the continuing
presence of a security concern required demonstration and there must be a coherent
policy in place concerning the denial of visits, with due regard paid to other methods
which might assist in preventing breaches of security.
The issue of whether a breach of Article 8 has been in accordance with law has been
discussed the prison context in the case of Ostrovar v. Moldova.34 In that case, a prisoner
had been denied correspondence with his mother. A domestic law on pre-trial detention
was cited by the authorities as the legal ground for this denial. The Court recalled that the
expression “in accordance with law” relates not only to the presence of a law, but also its
quality. The domestic law must indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of
exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities so as to ensure to
individuals the minimum degree of protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule
of law in a democratic society. In Ostrovar the Court held it was:

satisfied that this provision met the requirement of accessibility. However, the same
is not the case in respect of the requirement of foreseeability. The provision did not
draw any distinction between the different categories of persons with whom the
prisoners could correspond. Also it did not lay down any principles governing the
grant or refusal of authorisation, at least until 18 July 2003, when the provision was
amended… It is also to be noted that the provision failed to specify the time-frame
within which the restriction on correspondence could apply. No mention was made
as to the possibility of challenging the refusal to issue an authorisation or as to the
authority competent to rule on such a challenge.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that Article 18 of
the Law on Pre-Trial Detention did not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and
manner of the exercise of discretion conferred on the public authorities in respect of
restrictions on prisoners’ correspondence. It follows that the interference complained
of was not “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8.
The Court therefore found a violation.

33 31 May 2011, no. 24205/06.
34 13 September 2005, no. 35207/03.
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FAIR PROCEDURES
The European Prison Rules, under Rule 70(2), state that a prisoner should receive reasons
if a request is denied or a complaint is rejected and the prisoner shall have a right of
appeal to an independent authority. Moreover, it could be argued that actions are taken
‘not in accordance with law’ if there is no statutory basis for them, or if the statutory basis
is very unclear.
It should, however, be noted that the Irish courts have regularly cited the wide discretion
afforded to a prison Governor in performing his duties. For example, the High Court in
Foy v. Governor of Charleton J held:

It is only possible to mount a challenge to the decision of a Governor where it is
shown to both infringe a right and, as to the balance of the exercise of that right
with the duty of the Governor to ensure proper order within the prison, to fly in
the face of fundamental reason and common sense. Such cases are, of their nature,
difficult to prove. A prison Governor is entitled to some measure of latitude in
judgment as to the decision which he or she makes.35
The question of the duty to give reasons and the generally applicable principles of fair
procedures to administrative actions has not examined extensively in the prison context
by the Irish courts. The argument could well be made that the prison service, as a public
body, should give reasons for its decisions especially when matters of fundamental rights
are involved. In Meadows v. Minister for Justice36 Murray CJ held that, while the duty to give
reasons varied depending on the nature of the impugned decision,:

An administrative decision affecting the rights and obligations of persons should
at least disclose the essential rationale on foot of which the decision is taken.
That rationale should be patent from the terms of the decision or capable of being
inferred from its terms and its context. Unless that is so then the constitutional
right of access to the courts to have the legality of an administrative decision
judicially reviewed could be rendered either pointless or so circumscribed as to be
unacceptably ineffective.37

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR DEATHS IN PRISON
This section examines caselaw on the duty to investigate deaths of those in prison
custody. It explores the position of the European Court of Human Rights on what is an
effective investigation into such deaths for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.
It also indicates some ways in which current procedures for investigating deaths in prison
custody in Ireland may not be in compliance with the Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that the State is under a duty to
protect the lives of those in its custody.38 This means the State must take reasonable
steps to prevent risks to life, whether they come from prison staff, the prison itself, other
prisoners, or a prisoner him or herself.

35
36
37
38
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In addition, Article 2 imposes an obligation on states to provide an effective system to
hold those liable for deaths in custody to account. The case of Salman v. Turkey39 held
that when a person dies in custody, there is an important obligation on the authorities to
account for the person’s treatment while detained. This applies whether or not the death
was caused by the agents of the State.40 An effective investigation is necessary in order to
ensure that failings which gave rise to a death are subject to public scrutiny and remedy.
An English case summed up the need for investigations well: “the procedural obligation
introduced by article 2 has three interlocking aims: to minimise the risk of future like
deaths; to give the beginnings of justice to the bereaved; and to assuage the anxieties
of the public”.41 The European Court of Human Rights has said that the right to life under
Article 2 of the Convention requires that there be an investigation into a death in custody
which fulfils certain minimum requirements.

•

It must be started by the State (i.e. not taken through, for example, a legal
case instigated by the deceased’s family);

•

It must be independent of those implicated or who might be responsible for
the death. It should be carried out by somebody outside the prison system
and be independent in its actions and procedures;

•

It should be prompt;

•

It should be open to public scrutiny;

•

The investigation must be capable to giving rise to a finding of responsibility
and to enable the eventual prosecution of those responsible through
obtaining relevant evidence;

•

Finally, the next of kin of the deceased must be given an opportunity to
participate and be involved to the extent necessary to safeguard their
legitimate interests.42

It is for the State to prove that it undertook an effective investigation and to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation for a death in prison.43
At present in Ireland, investigations into deaths in prison custody usually involve an
inquest and an internal prison investigation. There may be a trial or a sentence of an
individual directly responsible for the death. In April 2012, it was announced that the
Inspector of Prisons will now also investigate all deaths of those in the custody of the
Irish Prison Service, whether the individual was physically within a prison or not. At the
time of writing it was not clear, however, what powers the Inspector would have, e.g. if
the Inspector will be able to compel witnesses to provide information. On one occasion,
a commission of inquiry under the Commission of Inquiries Act 2004 was established to
examine the death of a prisoner in Mountjoy prison.

39
40
41
42

27 June 2000, no. 21986/93.
Salman v. Turkey, 27 June 2000, no 21986/93, at paragraph 105.
R (on the application of Khan) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 1129.
Edwards v. United Kingdom 14 June 2002, no. 46477/99; (2002) 35 EHRR 487; Kats and others v. Ukraine,
18 March 2009, no. 29971/04.
43 Salman v. Turkey, 27 June 2000, no 21986/93, at paragraph 100.
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The European Court of Human Rights has stated that no particular model of investigation
is required by Article 2. However, any such investigation must fulfil the conditions noted
above. Some of these requirements have been discussed by the European Court of Human
Rights and domestic courts interpreting the Convention.
As will be seen below, there is some doubt as to whether our current system of
investigating deaths in prison complies with Article 2.

PARTICIPATION OF THE NEXT OF KIN
The case of Edwards v. United Kingdom44 concerned the death of a prisoner by another
prisoner, Richard Linford, who was suffering from mental illness. The deceased,
Christopher Edwards, had been placed in a cell with this prisoner because of a shortage
of space. That evening, the call button in the cell was pressed. A prison officer who
responded noticed that the buzzer which should have been ringing was not working.
Later in the night, a prison officer heard a buzzer but did not see an emergency red light
on the wing in which Mr Edwards and Mr. Linford were in custody. Later again, a prison
officer heard continuous banging on a cell door. On investigating this, he discovered
a green call light on outside Mr Edwards and Mr. Linford’s cell. Inside, Mr. Linford was
holding a bloodstained plastic fork and there was blood on the floor and on his feet. A
five minute delay ensued in which prison officers put on protective clothing. When they
entered the cell, they found Mr. Edwards dead, having been stamped and kicked by his
cellmate. The wing on which the cell was located had been patrolled earlier in the night
and up to seventeen minutes could have passed after the call button had been pressed.
An inquiry was started into the death of Mr. Edwards in prison by the Prison Service in
the UK, the local County Council and the local health authority. Although the internal
report was extensive, the European Court of Human Rights held that it did not meet the
requirements of Article 2. The authors could not require witnesses to attend hearings and
the parents of Mr. Edwards were only allowed to attend the inquiry when giving their own
evidence and could not receive the evidence of others until the final report was published.
They could not put questions to any witnesses and were not legally represented.
In Kats v. Ukraine45 the effective exclusion of the family of a prisoner who had died from
medical complications in custody from the subsequent inquiry and the lack of even
basic information about its progress were considered to breach the requirement that the
interests of the next-of-kin be safeguarded.

44 Edwards v. United Kingdom 14 June 2002, no. 46477/99; (2002) 35 EHRR 487.
45 Kats and others v. Ukraine, 18 March 2009, no. 29971/04.
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LEGAL AID
The next-of-kin of a person who has died in prison are not automatically entitled to legal
aid at an inquest in Ireland. Discretionary payments may be made by the Department of
Justice and Equality to cover the cost where a person died in the care of the State or in
custody, or where the State was directly involved in the death.
The Irish Supreme Court in Magee v Farrell46 has found that legal aid is not required under
the Constitution or the Convention for families at inquests into the deaths of a person
in Garda custody. This is in contrast to the finding of the House of Lords in R (Amin) v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department47 (hereinafter Amin) where it was held that
legal aid is required under Article 2 in circumstances where the State may have been
involved in some way in the death. The position in the UK is that legal aid is provided in
these circumstances, subject to the family’s financial position.

PUBLIC INQUIRIES
While all investigations must be open to public scrutiny in order to comply with Article
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, what this means depends on the
circumstances. It is not possible to state with certainty when a full public inquiry, where
all the evidence is heard in public, is required.
Some guidance is given by reference to previous cases decided by the European Court
of Human Rights. In Edwards the Court stated that, in some circumstances, publication
of the report into the death alone will be enough to fulfil the requirements of Article 2.
However, in circumstances where “the deceased was a vulnerable individual who had lost
his life in a horrendous manner due to a series of failures by public bodies and servants
who bore a responsibility to guard his welfare… the public interest attaching to the issues
thrown up by the case was such as to call for the widest exposure possible”.48
The House of Lords also examined this issue in Amin. There, a young man was murdered
in a racially motivated attack by another prisoner with whom he was sharing a cell. That
prisoner had a record of violence and prison staff were concerned about his potential
dangerousness to staff and other inmates.
The prisoner who attacked the deceased was found guilty of murder. His trial did not,
however, explore any of the wider issues within the prison such as the procedures by
which cells were allocated. An inquest into the death was adjourned to wait for the
criminal proceedings to finish. The Prison Service also conducted its own investigation.
The Commission for Racial Equality also carried out an inquiry.
None of these inquiries, however, involved a formal role for the family of the deceased.
His family refused to participate in an indirect way and sought an independent public
inquiry; this was refused. The House of Lords accepted that there is no single model of
investigation laid down by Article 2. However, in the circumstances of the death, involving
general and system-wide failures in decision-making about who should share cells, the
failure to follow established procedures and the likelihood of human error within the
prison, only a public and independent investigation with legal representation for the
family would be enough to uphold their rights accruing under Article 2.

46 [2009] 4 IR 703.
47 [2004] 1 AC 653; [2003] 3 WLR 1169; [2004] 2 All ER 465.
48 Edwards v. United Kingdom 14 June 2002, no. 46477/99; (2002) 35 EHRR 487, at paragraph 83.
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By contrast, however, in Scholes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department49 no breach
of Article 2 was found where a public inquiry was not established to examine the suicide
of a vulnerable 16 year old boy who was considered at risk of self-harming. The inquest
into his death had lasted for ten days and covered a wide range of issues, including the
policies and practices and there were other suitable investigations also carried out. This
was considered to be sufficient for the purposes of Article 2.

DELAY
Promptness or reasonable speed in conducting the investigation is also a requirement
under Article 2. This was considered by the European Court of Human Rights to be
“essential in maintaining public confidence in their [the authorities’] adherence to the rule
of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts”.50
The Court also considered speed to be important because the passage of time can affect
the amount and quality of evidence, cast doubt on the good faith of the investigators and
prolong the ordeal for the family involved.51
The Court has not, however, indicated what might be considered an undue delay in the
context of deaths in prison. In Edwards a delay of three and a half years did not breach the
requirements of Article 2, especially as the preparation for the inquiry took a long time. In
Kats v. Ukraine, the court held that the authorities must act with “exemplary diligence and
promptness”,52 but did not specify how long is considered ‘too long’.

VERDICTS AT INQUESTS: SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY ARTICLE 2?
The question of what kind of inquiry is required by Article 2 was considered in some depth
by the House of Lords in R (Middleton) v. West Somerset Coroner and another53 (hereinafter
Middleton). Here a prisoner had committed suicide and an inquest was held into his death.
As Lord Bingham of Cornhill recognised “the European Court has never expressly ruled
what the final product on an official investigation… should be”.54 What is required is a
mechanism to ensure the safeguards contained in Article 2 are rendered practical and
effective.
In Middleton the House of Lords examined a number of possibilities. Lord Bingham
of Cornhill felt that in some cases criminal proceedings may discharge the state’s
obligations, but this would usually be in cases where a defendant pleads not guilty and
the trial involves full exploration of the facts of the death.

49
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[2006] EWCA Civ 1343.
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The House of Lords came to the conclusion that in order to satisfy Article 2, an inquest
into a death in custody must allow for the possibility that the responsibility of the
prison authorities could be established and be capable of leading to the identification
and punishment of those responsible for the death. Lord Bingham of Cornhill held that
an inquest “ought ordinarily to culminate in an expression, however, brief of the jury’s
conclusion on the disputed factual issues at the heart of the case”.55
Lord Bingham of Cornhill considered that inquests which give rise to the traditional short
verdict of suicide, unlawful killing, misadventure, etc may enable a conclusion to be made
on the central issue involved if that issue was whether the prisoner had committed suicide
or was killed by another. However, this would not be enough in cases where there may
have been other, much broader, factors at play. For example, in Edwards or Amin a verdict
of unlawful killing would not have said anything about the procedures which culminated
in the deceased and his killer sharing a cell.56 As such, inquests with these restrictions
were considered to be insufficient to comply with Article 2 in these more complex cases.
Lord Bingham was fortified in his conclusion by the fact that an “uninformative” verdict
would not provide any satisfaction to the family that lessons learned may save the lives of
others.57 As such, the House of Lords recommended that the duty of investigating deaths
must be extended to examine not only the means of death but also the circumstances
thereof. In these cases, Lord Bingham recommended that inquests give rise to a narrative
verdict or answer a series of questions. These questions include what was the cause or
what were the causes of death, were there any defects in the system which contributed to
the death and were there any other factors relevant to the circumstances of the death.58
Narrative verdicts are now a feature of inquests in the United Kingdom. In Ireland, at
present,59 the inquest continues only to be able to give the traditional verdicts, though
recommendations about broader matters which may have contributed to the death can be
made. In circumstances such as those at issue in Amin or Edwards it may well be the case
that these verdicts would be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 2.

SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR SYSTEMS FOR INVESTIGATING DEATHS IN CUSTODY
There are a number of matters which indicate that our system of investigating deaths
may not comply with Article 2. The lack of narrative verdicts at inquests and the absence
of automatic legal aid for families, along with the possibility that an inquest might be
delayed or suspended pending the outcome of a criminal trial raise concerns. Trials of
criminal offences have a very limited role for the family and there is little opportunity to
examine failures in the policies within a prison which may have contributed to the death.

55 [2004] UKHL 11, at paragraph 20.
56 [2004] UKHL 11, at paragraph 31.
57 [2004] UKHL 11, at paragraph 18.
58	The example in Middleton was that “the deceased took his own life, in part because the risk of his doing
so was not recognised and appropriate precautions were not taken to prevent him doing so”, at paragraph
45. In R (Sacker) v. West Yorkshire Coroner the House of Lords held that the Coroners Act 1988 could be
interpreted to allow the jury at an inquest to inquire into how a person had died, including systemic failures.
[2004] 1 WLR 796.
59 The Coroners Bill 2007 proposes a change to the law in this regard. At the time of writing, it is not clear
when this Bill will become law.
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The ability to compel the attendance of witnesses to an inquiry which can examine
questions of systemic failure is also at issue. It is not clear yet if the Inspector of Prisons
will be conferred with such powers. In some cases, particularly those involving vulnerable
individuals, the Convention has been interpreted to require a fully public inquiry, which
has yet to happen in the Irish context.

ALLEGATIONS OF ILL TREATMENT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INCIDENTS OF NEAR DEATH OR SERIOUS SELF HARM
If a prisoner makes an allegation that s/he has been the subject of ill-treatment
amounting to a breach of Article 3, the European Court of Human Rights has laid down
particular requirements for the nature of the investigation which must take place.
In Assenov v. Bulgaria the Court stated:

Where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated
by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article
3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article
1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in… [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there
should be an effective official investigation. This investigation, as with that under
Article 2, should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of
those responsible. If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental
importance, would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases
for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual
impunity.60
Article 3 therefore has a procedural dimension whereby it requires mechanisms to prevent
breaches of Article 3 and proper investigations where such breaches have taken place.
The case of Labita v. Italy61 concerned a prisoner alleging ill-treatment at the hands
of prison officers. The Court found that there had not been a thorough and effective
investigation into the allegations and thus a violation of Article 3, even in circumstances
where the Court did not have sufficient evidence that the treatment itself amounted
to a breach of Article 3. As van zyl Smit and Snacken aver: “the outcome in Labita is an
illustration of just how much weight the Court attaches to the effective investigation of
serious complaints”.62
While Article 3 does have a procedural component, it is not as extensive as that under
Article 2. Independent disciplinary proceedings and criminal investigations may fulfil the
requirements for an effective investigation under Article 3.

60 28 October 1994, no. 90/1997/874/1086, at paragraph 12.
61 6 April 2000, no. 26772/95.
62 van zyl Smit and Snacken, Principles of European Prison Law and Policy
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), at p. 308.
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The European Court of Human Rights examined the requirement to hold investigations
under Article 3 in Banks v. United Kingdom (hereinafter Banks).63 The applicants were
nine former prisoners of Wormwood Scrubs while the tenth was the brother of a prisoner
who had died there through hanging in worrying circumstances. The first nine applicants
had been subjected to serious assaults at the hands of prison officers during the 1990s.
In some cases, prosecutions of these officers had been instituted and a number of
these had led to convictions. Most of the applicants had already received compensation
in settlement of their civil claims arising out of this abuse. The tenth applicant alleged
that his brother’s hanging had in fact arisen out of the actions of prison officers. Civil
cases involving the prison had given rise to evidence of death threats being made against
prisoners and mock hangings being carried out by prison officers. All the applicants sought
an investigation into what they considered to be a culture of abuse at Wormwood Scrubs.
The Prison Service had carried out a number of investigations, staff were suspended,
prosecutions had followed, civil claims had been brought by inmates and new measures
had been taken to address the failings in the prison. There was no public inquiry. The
applicants complained to the European Court of Human Rights that there had been a
failure to provide an adequate investigation into allegations of torture and ill-treatment.
They considered that an independent public inquiry, establishing the factual background,
full nature and extent of the “culture of violence” at Wormwood Scrubs, how it took
root and continued, as well as establishing responsibility, was necessary to fulfil the
obligations under Article 3. The tenth applicant also alleged a breach of the procedural
aspect of Article 2. All also alleged a breach of their rights under Article 13.
The Court declared their applications inadmissible. It noted that the obligations arising
out of Articles 2 and 3 were different in both content and applicability. Article 2 imposed
obligations of particular stringency when the victim was deceased and the only persons
with full knowledge of what had occurred were the officers of the State.
In the case of Article 3, victims were generally able to act on their own behalf and give
evidence of what had occurred. As such, according to the Court there is a “different
emphasis”.64 The Court felt that in the normal course of events, a criminal trial with an
adversarial procedure before an independent and impartial judge “must be regarded as
furnishing the strongest safeguards of an effective procedure for the finding of facts and
the attribution of criminal responsibility for unlawful acts of violence” under Article 3.65
Secondly, where the allegations made are not of intentional violence but raise issues of
negligence, civil or disciplinary remedies may be sufficient to provide protection under
Article 2. In this regard, the Court referred to the use of civil proceedings in cases of
medical negligence and felt similar considerations arose under Article 3. The applicants
had taken civil proceedings which alleged systemic negligence and they could have raised
any alleged failings in management, training and supervision linked to their ill-treatment,
but they settled these proceedings.

63 (2007) 45 EHRR, no. 21387/05.
64 (2007) 45 EHRR, no. 21387/05, at paragraph 3.
65 (2007) 45 EHRR, no. 21387/05, at page 7.
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Finally, if there were “wider issues” which had not been ventilated in either forum, Article
3 was not an appropriate mechanism by which to bring them to light. Article 3 requires
that where a State or its agents potentially bear responsibility for serious ill-treatment
the events in question should be subject to an effective investigation which enables the
facts to become known. Here there was no indication that there had not been a sufficient
investigation of the facts or a failure to hold those responsible to account, either civilly
or criminally. The wider issues such as the background to the assaults and the remedial
matters to prevent a recurrence in prison were “matters for public and political debate
which fall outside of the scope of Article 3”.66 The Court noted that Article 2 requires an
examination of systemic issues, but Article 3 investigations are aimed at establishing the
facts and attributing responsibility rather than identifying the root cause of the problems
and how to eradicate them. As such the Court declined to find a breach of Article 3 and
rejected the application. The application under Article 13 was also rejected.
The distinction between the requirements of Articles 2 and 3 has been followed in English
caselaw as noted below. However, Lord Sedley LJ dissenting in AM and others v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department held that, in his view, there should be no difference between
the investigative obligations under both articles.67

‘NEAR SUICIDES’ AND SERIOUS SELF HARM IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Recently, some interesting decisions have been given in England and Wales regarding the
duty to investigate ‘near’ suicides or incidents of serious self-harm in prison. In R (D) v. The
Secretary of State for the Home Department68 the Court of Appeal for England and Wales
was asked to determine the procedural requirements for an inquiry into a near-suicide. D
had a history of self-harm and was considered at risk of suicide. D hanged himself using bed
linen which had not been removed from his cell. Though he was cut down by prison staff,
which saved his life, he nonetheless suffered permanent and irreversible brain damage.
The Court of Appeal agreed with comments made in Amin that the duty to investigate deaths
in prison under Article 2 also arises in cases where the victim does not die but has sustained
“life threatening injuries”, even in the case of self-harm.69
There had been an internal prison service investigation and the Home Secretary then asked
the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman to hold a further inquiry. This inquiry was to be held
in private, with all evidence to be provided to representatives of the prisoner who were given
an opportunity to comment on it. The Court was asked to decide whether a public inquiry
was necessary. The Court agreed that in most cases an inquest, with a narrative verdict,
in combination with a private Ombudsman investigation would cumulatively fulfil the
requirements of Article 2.
However, in deciding that a public inquiry was necessary, the court interpreted
Amin expansively. The Court considered that while the facts of the incident before it were
not identical to those in Amin, the circumstances in which a suicide very nearly succeeded
required similar public examination. The vulnerability of the deceased and the problems
with the procedures in the prison were influential factors. The court also stressed
that a public inquiry does not mean that every aspect must be carried out in public.
The preliminary processes of obtaining evidence and witness statements can be in private,
but the evidence and written submissions must be made public and oral evidence must
be taken in a public forum.
66
67
68
69
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The Court further examined whether Article 2 required the facility for the family of
a deceased person or representatives of D in this case to cross examine witnesses.
The court did not feel that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
required this, but that an ability to put questions through the chairperson of the inquiry,
if considered appropriate, was necessary. The court did hold that the representatives
are entitled to see written evidence, to be present during oral evidence and to make
submissions about the lines of enquiry which should be adopted, the questions to
be asked and who should be permitted to ask questions. This, it was felt, met the
requirement to safeguard the legitimate interests of the representatives of D. Funding for
the representatives of D was also considered “manifestly reasonable”.70
Though laying down the principle that an Article 2-compliant investigation may be required
in cases of ‘near’ suicide, D did not resolve the issue of when exactly such an investigation
would be needed.
The matter was returned to by the House of Lords in JL v. Secretary of State for Justice.71 JL
had attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself with a sheet. He was discovered and
resuscitated but was left with serious brain damage and incompetent to conduct his own
affairs. An internal prison investigation was carried out and JL sought an order requiring
the Secretary of State to conduct an investigation satisfying Article 2.
The Court of Appeal ruled that a D type investigation was required. After the conclusion of
the appeal, the Secretary of State decided to hold such an investigation but appealed the
Court of Appeal verdict due to fears about the costs involved if such investigations were
required generally.
It was accepted by the Secretary of State that where there is a suicide or near suicide72
that there must be an initial investigation of the facts, which may give rise to the need
for a further investigation. The issues for consideration before the House of Lords were,
therefore:

1.

Must the initial investigation be carried out by a person independent of the
prison authorities?

2.

Must a further investigation be held whenever it is not plain from the initial
investigation that the State or its agents bear no responsibility for the nearsuicide or only where the initial investigation demonstrates that there is an
arguable case that the State was at fault.

Where a further investigation is required, must this necessarily be a D type investigation.73
The Law Lords issued five separate judgments, and, despite the extensive discussion of
the issues, regrettably the answers to these questions remain somewhat unclear.

70 [2006] EWCA Civ 143, at paragraph 47.
71 [2008] UKHL 68.
72  Defined in the Secretary of State’s submissions as one that nearly
succeeds and leaves the prisoner with serious injuries.
73 [2008] UKHL 68, at paragraph 14.
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Lord Phillips of Worth Martravers, who gave the leading judgment, expressed his
reservations about the possibility of giving definitive guidance that will apply in every
case of near-suicide in prison. However, his Lordship did feel it possible to identify certain
principles that “will normally apply to such cases”.74 His remarks however, were expressly
confined to the situation where a prisoner’s attempt at suicide comes close to success
and leaves the prisoner with the possibility of serious long term injury.
His Lordship considered it unhelpful to conflate the principles applicable in the case of
death to those of near-suicide and felt that the procedure which occurs upon a death
in custody is justifiably different. As such, an inquiry akin to an inquest may not be
necessary. That said, his Lordship expressly refuted the Secretary of State’s argument
that the purpose of an Article 2 investigation into a near suicide in prison is to secure
the accountability of agents of the State regarding possible breaches of Article 2. Lord
Phillips, reviewing the ECHR jurisprudence as well as Amin and R (Gentle) v. Prime
Minister,75 held that the purpose of such an investigation is broader and includes the need
to see whether lessons can be learned for the future, regardless of whether there was
fault on behalf of the State.
Overall, Lord Phillips concluded that a near-suicide in custody which leaves a prisoner
with the possibility of a serious long-term injury automatically triggers an obligation on
the State to institute an ‘enhanced’ (i.e. independent) investigation, which obligation is not
discharged by an internal assessment of the facts. Finally, his Lordship ruled, somewhat
opaquely, that in some circumstances an initial investigation may satisfy Article 2, in
others a D type inquiry might be necessary.
In answering the second question before the House of Lords, Lord Phillips ruled that
whether or not a further investigation is required depends on the nature of the initial
investigation. The initial investigation should be prompt in any event. If all the material
witnesses are available, give their evidence freely, the course of events appears clear
and there is no indication of a possible defect in the system for preventing suicides
nor a shortcoming on the part of anyone operating that system, the initial investigation
may be enough. If the prisoner or his representatives are involved and the report of the
investigation is published the other requirements of an enhanced investigation “may be
satisfied”.76 His Lordship clearly favoured a rigorous initial investigation given the costs of
a D type inquiry.
There may be circumstances, however, when a public inquiry remains necessary.
Such circumstances included, but were not limited to, Edwards-type scenarios where
the events were themselves so horrendous that the public interest required the widest
exposure possible, and situations where witnesses refused to give evidence and powers
of compellability became necessary. Other situations noted by Lord Phillips were
those where serious conflicts of evidence arose. There may be still others where the
independent investigator may recommend a D type inquiry or indeed assess a particular
area further without invoking D. Though not laying down any legal principle, his Lordship
considered it “good sense” to hold independent investigations involving the person
harmed and/or his or her family in all cases of attempted suicide, serious self harm and
other near deaths.

74 [2008] UKHL 68, at paragraph 15.
75 [2008] UKHL 20.
76 [2008] UKHL 68, at paragraph 43.
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Lord Rodger of Earlsferry also rejected the contention that an independent investigation in
the case of suicide is not required unless there was some positive reason to believe that the
authorities had been in breach of their obligation to protect the prisoner. His Lordship felt
that when a prisoner kills himself, it is at least possible that the prison authorities failed in
their obligations. Without an independent investigation “you might never know”.77 Such an
investigation is required, his Lordship held, to see whether there was in fact a violation.
Holding that an independent investigation is required into all cases of suicide, Lord Rodger
then went on to consider whether the same principles applied in cases of near suicide.
The principles laid down in his judgment must, however, be considered tentative as he
felt it unwise to “venture far without the benefit of full argument”.78
Lord Rodger placed a great deal of emphasis on the type of injuries arising out of an
attempted suicide. While the prisoner who is unable to walk again following an attempted
suicide has been a victim of a breach of Article 2 in the same way as somebody left with
major mental injuries, his Lordship noted an important difference in their positions. The
prisoner who has his mental faculties intact is able to take the appropriate civil proceedings
regarding a breach of Article 2. However, those in the position of JL are incapable of looking
after their own interests. In Lord Rodger’s view, this situation is more like the position when
a person has succeeded in committing suicide.79 Reasoning this way, Lord Rodger felt that
Article 2 required an independent inquiry where a prisoner’s life is put at risk and, due to
the resulting injuries, she or he cannot take steps to hold the authorities responsible for any
failures on the part of the authorities.
Despite apparently laying down a clear principle that an independent investigation is only
required in cases of near suicide when a prisoner is, rendered mentally incompetent to take
proceedings, his Lordship stated that he had formed no concluded view on such matters.80
He did say, however, that in the present circumstances of JL’s case, the Secretary of State
was right to hold a D-type investigation.
Lord Walker felt that he could not give detailed guidance on the circumstances in which
a D-type inquiry is necessary and doubted whether any other court could do likewise.
However, even though any statements on the topic would be “no more than expressions
of opinion”, he nonetheless offered some “tentative views”.81 His Lordship held “even in
cases where there is no serious permanent injury, investigation may be needed if the selfharmer was a known suicide risk or if the means of self-harm (whether a ligature, a sharp
instrument or some harmful substance) suggested a failure in the system of searches”82
and noted there may be other special cases calling for investigation.
Lord Walker agreed that an independent investigation should be carried out as soon
as possible and that relatively few cases would require public investigation, but did not
intimate the nature of those that would. He agreed, however, with Lord Brown’s view
that near-suicide cases which result in lasting serious injury require an independent
investigation with the involvement of the person or their family and that the Ombudsman
was the appropriate person to carry out the investigation. In addition, the investigation must
be initiated by the state, be reasonably expeditiously carried out, and provide for a sufficient
element of public scrutiny. As Lord Brown stated, however, “beyond this, however, it is
impossible to be prescriptive”.83
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Lords Brown and Walker felt that public inquiries w Lords, Lord Brown agreed with Lord
Phillips of Worth Matravers’ reasons for rejecting the Secretary of State’s contention that
an Article 2 investigation is only needed where the State is in arguable breach of its duties
under Article 2 and this is only so where the prison authorities knew or ought to have
known of a real and immediate risk of the prisoner committing suicide and failed then to
take reasonable preventive measures.
His Lordship felt that a public inquiry along the lines of a D-type investigation “goes far
beyond what is necessary to satisfy the Article 2 procedural duty arising in any save the
most exceptional near-suicide case”.84 In fact, Lord Brown declared his view that D was
itself wrongly decided.
Lord Mance also agreed that the appeal should be dismissed and held that in all cases
where the state’s system for preventing suicide fails and as a result the prisoner suffers
injuries in circumstances of near-suicide significantly affecting his or her ability to
know, investigate, assess and/or take action by him or herself in relation to what has
happened, an Article 2 investigation was needed.85 Lord Mance also felt that an Article
2 investigation was required in JL’s case. He further agreed with Lord Phillips’ view that
there is a difference between cases in which a prisoner is able to take action on his or her
own behalf and those in which a prisoner is rendered incompetent to do so. His Lordship
agreed with Lord Walker that public inquiries would be relatively rare, but that
an independent investigation would be needed in cases of serious long-term injury and
with Lord Brown that D was wrongly decided.
Overall, the House of Lords decided that an Article 2 compliant inquiry is required each
time the state’s system for preventing a suicide in custody fails and that it is for the
State to account for the failure and the investigation must be prompt, involve the family
and allow for a sufficient degree of public scrutiny. A public hearing will be necessary in
exceptional cases.
‘SP’ v. Secretary of State for Justice86 examined the impact of JL. In that case SP was a young
woman remanded in a young offender institution. Before and during her incarceration SP
self-harmed regularly and became a danger to herself and others. Although this was not a
case of near suicide but rather serious self harm threatening the life of SP, the Secretary
of State at the Home Department agreed to hold an Article 2 compliant investigation into
her circumstances. This was to be held by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO).
However, after protracted correspondence and concerns from the Howard League of Penal
Reform about the inquiry’s terms of reference, the PPO withdrew from the investigation,
citing his dissatisfaction with inter alia what he considered to be an undue ‘legalisation’ of
the process and the proposal that the Prison Service should decide which documents were
relevant to his investigation. Eventually another investigator was appointed, though he was
eventually held to lack the required independence.
There were many issues canvassed in SP, but for present purposes Pitchford J’s analysis
of JL is the most interesting aspect of the judgment. The judge ruled, based on JL, that the
first or evidence-gathering stage of such an investigation may be held in private subject,
in an appropriate case, to publication of the report. Thereafter it is for the investigator to
assess whether public hearings were necessary.

84 [2008] UKHL 68, at paragraph 104.
85 [2008] UKHL 68, at paragraph 113.
86 [2009] EWHC 13 (Admin).
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More recently, another important judgment has been laid down by the Court of Appeal in
England and Wales. In R (on the application of P) v. Secretary of State for Justice,87 P was
a prisoner in Feltham Young Offenders’ Institution. He had a long history of very serious
self harm and while in Feltham engaged in numerous and frequent incidents of this
nature. The Howard League for Penal Reform wrote to the Secretary of State expressing
concern about P’s situation while medical professionals indicated that the extent of
self-harm was such as to place him at a real risk of death. The health services at Feltham
were not able to provide adequate care for him. The Howard League for Penal Reform
sought an inquiry into the treatment and conditions experienced by P in Feltham. At first
instance this was refused.
The Court of Appeal held that the circumstances did not call for an Article 2 inquiry,
ruling that Amin could not be read in this way, having been decided in the context of its
“notorious and tragic facts”.88 The Court also relied on Keenan v. UK to demonstrate that
Article 2 is invoked when the authorities knew or ought to have known of an immediate
risk to the life of an identified individual, regardless of whether this arises from a third
party or self harm.
The Court also considered JL and rejected the submission that it was authority for the
proposition that Article 2 requires an investigation into incidents of serious self harm.
The Law Lords had clearly confined their remarks to near-suicides.
Stanley Burton LJ also clarified that the Court of Appeal in JL, when it stated that “the
simple fact of death or serious injury of a person in custody gives rise to an obligation of
the State to conduct the enhanced type of investigation”,89 did not mean that ‘serious
injury’ required such investigation. This was on the grounds that the statements were
made obiter and did not reflect the European authorities. Serious injury could only give
rise to duties under Article 2 when they involved a risk to life.
As such, the Court of Appeal felt that because P’s case was not one of attempted suicide, no
investigation was required by Article 2. His self-harming could lead to life threatening injury
or disease but this could not be assimilated to cases of suicide or near suicide. The risk to
his life was real, but it was not immediate.90 No investigation was required by Article 2.
Stanley Button LJ then turned his attention to the possibility of a duty to investigate being
imposed by Article 3. He held that there was no such obligation due to the fact that there
was no evidence of an arguable breach of Article 3, the legal provisions regarding the
transfer of prisoners with particular disorders to hospital were not the proper subject of
such an inquiry and, even if there were an arguable breach, it would not necessarily follow
that there was such a duty to investigate. All the relevant facts were known in P’s case and
no inquiry was required.
The court also went on to make some general points about investigations into breaches of
Article 3. It noted that the State is not required to make such an investigation in every case
where there has been an arguable breach of Article 3. Relying on Banks v. United Kingdom91
the judge ruled that the obligations under Articles 2 and 3 are different. In the case of
breaches of Article 3, the victim is generally alive and able to act on his own behalf. As such
there is a “different emphasis” and it is not always necessary to examine such complaints.
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In Banks the Court felt that the ‘procedural limb’ or the duty to investigate under Article
3 is principally engaged when the Court cannot reach a conclusion as to whether there
has been a breach of Article 3 and this is due to the failure of the authorities to react
effectively to the complaints at the time. The Court also noted generally that a criminal
trial is one of the strongest safeguards of an effective procedure for the finding of
facts and the attribution of criminal responsibility for unlawful acts of violence. Where
allegations are not of intentional violence at the hands of the State but raise issues of
negligence, a civil or disciplinary remedy may be sufficient to provide protection under
Article 2 and also under Article 3. Finally, the Court also noted that the facts were
investigated and disclosed in the course of the criminal trial. The wider background
of assaults and prevention of future occurrences in a prison were, in the Court’s view,
matters for public and political debate which fall outside the scope of Article 3.
The Court of Appeal also noted Lord Rodger’s point in JL that. where a victim can give
evidence about what happened and is able to act on his or her own behalf, a spontaneous
independent investigation may not be necessary and the lack thereof may only be of issue
if the court is unable to determine if there has been treatment prohibited by Article 3.
None of these issues have yet to be considered in the Irish context, but there have been no
public investigations of incidents of serious self-harm or ‘near suicides’ in our prisons. Nor
is it clear that there has been an independent preliminary examination of these incidents.
An Irish court has yet to grapple with the issues canvassed in these English cases.
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